SRA AML Annual Report 2025–26: improving figures, persistent gaps in practice

The SRA’s Anti-Money Laundering Annual Report 2025–26 shows law firms making progress, but the regulator is still finding weaknesses in how AML controls work in practice. For COLPs, MLCOs, MLROs and managing partners, it is a prompt to test whether their firm’s arrangements would stand up to regulatory scrutiny.

Published on 22 October 2026, the report covers the period from 6 April 2025 to 5 April 2026. During that time, the SRA completed 966 AML compliance assessments as part of 985 proactive engagements, its largest programme of proactive AML supervision to date.

The proportion of firms assessed as non-compliant fell from 32.4% to 21.9%, with approximately 78% assessed as compliant or partially compliant. These figures relate to the firms assessed through the SRA’s supervisory programme, rather than all 5,422 firms within the scope of the Money Laundering Regulations.

Enforcement activity nevertheless remained significant. Firms and solicitors received fines totalling approximately £2.6 million for anti-money laundering non-compliance comprising:

  • £2,003,759 through 145 regulatory settlement agreements.
  • £363,726 through 14 fines imposed by SRA adjudicators.
  • £228,000 through six fines imposed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.


The SRA cautions that enforcement outcomes often concern investigations opened in earlier reporting periods, so rising enforcement figures should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of deteriorating current compliance.

The improvement in compliance is encouraging, but the regulator says many of the issues identified concern the quality and application of controls rather than their absence. A firm can have an established compliance framework and still fall short in how it is applied.

For context, see our summary of the SRA’s 2024–25 AML Annual Report.

SRA AML Annual Report 2025–26: key findings at a glance

  • Non-compliance: 21.9% of assessed firms, down from 32.4%.
  • Firm-wide risk assessments (FWRAs): 60% assessed as compliant, up from 47%. Six firms had no FWRA and were referred for investigation.
  • Source of funds: 9% of the 5,349 files requiring source of funds or wealth checks had no such check. In 18% of files where supporting documents were gathered, the source of funds was not scrutinised.
  • Screening: Of 6,592 files reviewed, 20% had no evidence of politically exposed person (PEP) screening and 21% had no evidence of sanctions screening.
  • Sanctions cases: Cases involving failures to comply with sanctions regimes tripled compared with the previous reporting year, with many involving human or administrative errors.
  • Technology: Almost 93% of firms the SRA met used technology to assist with customer due diligence (CDD), but only 48% reported testing it often for accuracy.
  • File reviews: 86% of inspected firms carried out internal file reviews, but 36% of those firms did not consider source of funds as part of their reviews.
  • Independent audits: 63% of inspected firms had undertaken an independent AML audit, compared with 48% the previous year, although 18% of those audits were not fully compliant with regulation 21.

What are the SRA’s main AML compliance concerns?

Firm-wide risk assessments that do not reflect the firm’s activities

The SRA requested 937 firm-wide risk assessments during the reporting period. Six firms did not have an FWRA and were referred for investigation.

Of the remaining 931 assessments, 60% were compliant, compared with 47% in the previous reporting year.

Despite that improvement, the regulator identified several recurring weaknesses.

Some firms only produced an FWRA after the SRA requested one, despite having previously confirmed that one was in place. Others failed to provide an FWRA and instead submitted alternative documents, including AML policies, client and matter risk assessments or operational risk assessments focused on general business risks rather than money laundering risks.

The SRA also encountered incomplete templates, checklist-style assessments lacking sufficient detail and, in some instances, blank templates.

These findings are set out in the firm-wide risk assessments section of the SRA’s annual report.

Under regulation 18 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, firms within scope must identify and assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks to which their business is exposed.

An effective FWRA should address five key risk areas:

  1. Customers and clients.
  2. Countries and geographical areas.
  3. Products and services.
  4. Transactions.
  5. Delivery channels.


It should also reflect relevant external risk assessments, including the UK National Risk Assessment, and address specific exposures such as cryptoassets where these are relevant.

A conveyancing practice, for example, should be able to demonstrate that it has considered the risks arising from property transactions, third-party funding and unusual payment arrangements.

The SRA continues to identify conveyancing, particularly residential conveyancing, as an area of significant money laundering risk.

An assessment that devotes substantial attention to services the firm does not provide, while overlooking its everyday work, is unlikely to demonstrate effective risk management.

The relationship between firm-wide and matter-level risk assessments is equally important.

The SRA found instances where client and matter risk assessments did not align with the FWRA. Matters involving activities or jurisdictions identified as higher risk at firm level were sometimes assessed as low risk without an explanation.

Although the proportion of files with missing or incomplete client and matter risk assessments fell from 16% to 9%, the findings demonstrate why the quality of the reasoning matters as much as the presence of a completed form.

Enderley’s client and matter risk assessment training addresses the practical application of risk assessments within law firms.

Source of funds: understanding rather than collecting evidence

Source of funds remains a significant area of concern.

The SRA found that 9% of the 5,349 files requiring source of funds or wealth checks had no such check recorded.

In 18% of files where supporting documents had been gathered, the source of funds had not been scrutinised.

Source of funds or source of wealth issues were also identified in 29% of referrals for investigation arising from proactive supervision.

These findings are particularly concerning because 67% of the firms referred for investigation in connection with source of funds issues had a defined source of funds process in their policies.

That distinction matters. Having a procedure is not the same as applying it effectively.

The SRA’s thematic work reinforces the importance of critically assessing the information obtained, rather than simply collecting documents.

A bank statement, for example, may establish where money is held without explaining how it was acquired.

Similarly, accepting an explanation that funds represent savings, an inheritance or proceeds from a business sale may be insufficient where the circumstances warrant further enquiries.

Firms should adopt a proportionate, risk-based approach and record the information obtained, the assessment undertaken and the reasons for accepting the explanation.

Enderley has previously examined these issues in its articles on the SRA’s thematic review of source of funds and source of wealth and five steps to a strong source of funds check.

Sanctions and PEP screening: the evidence gap

The SRA described customer due diligence compliance as generally good, with 5% of reviewed files lacking evidence that the client’s identity had been identified and verified.

However, its screening findings present a more concerning picture.

Of the 6,592 files reviewed:

  • 20% contained no evidence of PEP screening.
  • 21% contained no evidence of sanctions screening.


These findings do not necessarily mean that screening was omitted in every case. However, they raise questions about firms’ ability to demonstrate that appropriate checks were undertaken.

The SRA also reported that cases involving failures to comply with sanctions regimes had tripled compared with the previous reporting year.

Much of this work involved human or administrative errors rather than deliberate misconduct.

The regulator also reported making one referral to the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) concerning a firm that had acted for a designated person without the required licence.

There were positive findings too. The proportion of firms requiring feedback on their sanctions controls or screening fell from 12% to 7%.

Financial sanctions obligations are distinct from AML requirements and can apply even where a firm’s services fall outside the scope of the Money Laundering Regulations.

Firms should therefore ensure that screening, escalation procedures and record keeping reflect their actual sanctions exposure.

For further guidance, see Enderley’s practical guide to OFSI sanctions enforcement for law firms.

The sanctions section of the SRA’s annual data return is also mandatory for every firm. Enderley’s guide to the 2026 AML and sanctions data collection explains the reporting requirements.

Are law firms testing their AML technology?

Electronic identity verification and screening technology is increasingly common.

Almost 93% of firms the SRA met used technology to assist with customer due diligence, compared with 90% the previous year.

The proportion reporting that they often tested the accuracy of their technology increased from 35% to 48%.

Although this represents progress, it also suggests that regular testing is not yet established practice across many firms.

This raises a practical question:

How does a firm know that its screening provider is identifying the risks it is supposed to identify?

Technology can support compliance, but responsibility remains with the regulated firm.

An electronic screening report is only as useful as the reviewer’s ability to understand and interpret its findings.

COLPs and MLCOs should consider whether systems are appropriately tested, whether alerts are investigated and whether staff understand the limitations of automated screening.

The risks are also evolving.

The SRA highlights the potential for technologies such as deepfakes to facilitate identity fraud, impersonation and attempts to circumvent customer due diligence, particularly where firms rely on remote onboarding.

HM Treasury and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology published guidance on digital identity verification for customer due diligence in February 2026.

Enderley’s guide to digital ID and AML compliance for law firms examines the implications for firms using digital verification services.

Are internal AML file reviews and independent audits robust enough?

The SRA found that 86% of inspected firms carried out internal file reviews.

However, 36% of those firms did not consider source of funds as part of their reviews, instead focusing on whether the required customer due diligence had been completed.

This is a significant distinction.

A review that confirms identity documents are present but does not assess the adequacy of source of funds enquiries may fail to identify a substantial compliance weakness.

Effective file reviews should examine the quality of risk assessments, due diligence decisions, ongoing monitoring and escalation procedures.

The objective should be to establish whether AML requirements have been applied effectively, rather than simply whether documents are present.

What did the SRA find about independent AML audits?

The annual report also identifies improvements in independent audit arrangements.

The proportion of inspected firms that had undertaken an independent AML audit increased from 48% to 63%.

However, 18% of those audits were not fully compliant with regulation 21.

Under regulation 21 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, firms must establish an independent audit function where appropriate to the size and nature of their business.

This is an important qualification.

Not every law firm is automatically required to commission an external independent AML audit.

Where an independent audit function is appropriate, it must examine and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the firm’s AML policies, controls and procedures, make recommendations and monitor compliance with those recommendations.

The SRA also makes clear that independence does not necessarily require an external consultancy.

An audit may be undertaken internally, provided the person conducting it is sufficiently independent of those responsible for developing and maintaining the firm’s AML framework.

For example, the SRA identifies the possibility of using a senior member of staff without responsibility for regulated work, or a suitable reciprocal arrangement between firms.

However, the auditor must have the necessary competence and independence to provide a meaningful assessment.

The SRA observed higher compliance levels among firms that had undertaken a compliant independent audit.

This reinforces the importance of assessing the quality of an audit, rather than treating its completion as a box-ticking exercise.

For firms considering external support, Enderley’s independent AML audit service includes reviews of policies, procedures and matter files, with practical recommendations for improvement.

What should law firms do following the SRA’s AML Annual Report?

The findings point to six practical priorities.

  1. Review the firm-wide risk assessment: Ensure the FWRA reflects the firm’s current services, clients, geographical exposure and actual financial crime risks. Check that it is appropriately documented, reviewed and updated.
  1. Test client and matter risk assessments. Check that risk ratings are supported by clear reasoning and are consistent with the FWRA. Where matters are assessed as lower risk despite higher-risk features, ensure that the rationale is properly documented.
  1. Examine source of funds procedures. Confirm that fee earners understand when additional enquiries are required and how conclusions should be recorded. File reviews should test whether the evidence obtained has been critically assessed.
  1. Review sanctions and PEP screening.  Check that appropriate screening is undertaken, documented and repeated where necessary.  Ensure that potential matches and concerns are escalated and investigated appropriately.
  1. Strengthen file reviews and independent audits.  Review whether internal monitoring examines the effectiveness of AML controls rather than simply checking for completed documentation. Where an independent audit function is required, ensure that it is sufficiently independent, appropriately scoped and followed by effective remedial action.
  1. Review policies against the SRA’s latest guidance. The SRA published further guidance on AML policies, controls and procedures alongside its annual report. This followed findings that 46% of the policies reviewed during 2025–26 were partially compliant or non-compliant.


Common weaknesses included insufficient coverage of new technologies, reliance on third parties for customer due diligence, simplified due diligence, Companies House discrepancy reporting and sanctions.

Firms should review their policies against the SRA’s current AML guidance and ensure that procedures reflect the way the practice actually operates.

Senior management should also consider whether findings from reviews, audits and compliance monitoring are appropriately reported and lead to demonstrable improvements.

The wider message: effective AML compliance must be evidenced

The SRA’s latest AML Annual Report provides encouraging evidence of improving compliance across the firms it assessed.

However, it also demonstrates that weaknesses in everyday implementation remain a significant regulatory concern.

A firm may have a comprehensive AML policy, but if fee earners do not follow it, risk assessments are poorly completed or warning signs are overlooked, the underlying risk remains.

For COLPs, MLCOs, MLROs and managing partners, the key question is not simply whether appropriate arrangements exist, but whether those arrangements work consistently and can be shown to work.

This will remain relevant as the government progresses its plans to transfer professional body AML supervision to the FCA.

Enderley’s guide to preparing for FCA AML supervision of lawyers examines what is currently known about the proposed transition.

Frequently asked questions

When was the SRA AML Annual Report 2025–26 published?

The SRA published its annual report on 22 October 2026. It covers the period from 6 April 2025 to 5 April 2026.

The SRA found that 21.9% of firms assessed through its proactive supervision programme were non-compliant, compared with 32.4% in the previous reporting year. This does not represent the proportion of all regulated firms that are non-compliant.

The regulator found that 9% of the 5,349 files requiring source of funds or wealth checks had no such check. In 18% of files where supporting documents were gathered, the source of funds had not been scrutinised.

An FWRA should identify and assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks the firm actually faces, considering its clients, geographical exposure, services, transactions and delivery channels.

It should be tailored to the firm’s activities, appropriately documented and kept under review. An AML policy or general operational risk assessment is not a substitute.

No. Regulation 21 requires an independent audit function where appropriate to the size and nature of the firm’s business.

Where such a function is required, it must be sufficiently independent and effective. It does not necessarily have to be provided by an external consultancy.