The Court of Appeal’s March judgment in Mazur restored the pre-existing delegation model for litigation. But the story did not end there. A last-minute clarification from the court on 22 April, prompted by a challenge to the Law Society’s own practice note, has put supervision squarely where it belongs: a regulatory matter, not a criminal one. Here is where things stand and what firms need to do.

We have covered the background to Mazur in earlier articles. To briefly recap: the High Court’s September 2025 judgment had sent shock waves through litigation practices by holding that only authorised persons could conduct litigation – full stop – with no scope for delegation to paralegals, trainees, or legal executives, even under solicitor supervision. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision on 31 March 2026, restoring the framework the profession had operated under for decades: unauthorised persons can lawfully perform litigation tasks, provided they do so for and on behalf of an authorised person who retains responsibility and exercises proper direction, management, supervision and control.

Most of the profession breathed  a sigh of relief. But there have been two significant post-judgment developments in the weeks since – one involving the Law Society’s new practice note, and one involving a last-minute clarification from the Court of Appeal itself – that are important for litigation teams to understand before treating the matter as fully resolved.

The Law Society practice note: welcome clarity, with a sting

On 13 April 2026, the Law Society published an updated practice note on Mazur and the conduct of litigation. Its overall message was reassuring: the Court of Appeal’s judgment is “less restrictive” than the High Court’s, delegation is permitted, and the pre-Mazur operating model can broadly resume. But the practice note was also clear that the flexibility the judgment restores comes with a non-negotiable condition: supervision must be real, documented, and effective.

The Law Society set out the following practical steps firms should be taking:

• Authorised person on every matter: Each litigation matter must have a named authorised individual responsible for it – someone whose practising rights include the conduct of litigation and who has the relevant technical skills and competence for the work in question. A solicitor’s name on a file is not sufficient if that person is not genuinely directing and overseeing the matter.
  
  
• Documented delegation: There must be a clear record of the delegated instructions given by the authorised individual to any non-authorised member of staff, covering key decisions and formal steps in the proceedings. Instructions can be specific or general – working to policies, guides, or protocols is acceptable – but the delegation must be evidenced.
  
  
• Calibrated supervision: The degree of oversight required will vary with circumstances. For complex or unfamiliar matters, approval may be needed before steps are taken. For routine work, it may be sufficient for the authorised individual to conduct regular meetings and sample the work. The key is that the level of supervision is proportionate and documented as a conscious decision, not a default.
  
  
• Policies and training: Firms should review their internal policies to ensure they document the steps involved in litigation processes and who carries each of them out. All staff involved in litigation – authorised and non-authorised – should be trained on the policies and procedures to be followed.
  
  
• Key formal trigger points: The authorised person must remain responsible for the key formal steps in litigation that constitute the conduct of litigation – such as issuing proceedings, filing statements of case, and making applications to the court. These cannot be delegated in a way that removes the authorised person’s genuine involvement and accountability.

Then came the clarification nobody expected

Here is where it gets more nuanced – and where the story took an unexpected turn last week.

The Law Society’s practice note included language about the consequences of breach that alarmed practitioners and other parties. Drawing on comments in the Court of Appeal judgment, it suggested that firms or solicitors could potentially commit a criminal offence -under the Legal Services Act 2007 – through inadequate supervision of unauthorised persons. In effect, its guidance appeared to conflate the question of whether supervision was ‘adequate’ with the question of criminal liability.

This interpretation was immediately contested. Iain Miller of Kingsley Napley, who had represented CILEX in the successful appeal, argued publicly that the Law Society’s guidance was wrong on this point: supervision is a regulatory matter, not a criminal one, and the Court of Appeal had throughout the hearing been at pains to avoid creating a framework in which the adequacy of a solicitor’s supervision of a paralegal could become the subject of criminal proceedings or satellite costs litigation. Making the criminal offence turn on whether supervision was ‘adequate’ by reference to regulatory standards would, in his view, produce exactly the uncertainty the court had tried to avoid.

The Law Society then did something unusual: it sought a declaration from the Court of Appeal to affirm its interpretation. On 22 April, the court declined to do so. It amended its judgment – adding a new paragraph 31A – to make clear that inadequate supervision does not, of itself, give rise to criminal liability under the Legal Services Act. The criminal offence is committed where an unauthorised person carries on the conduct of litigation without being properly authorised to do so. Whether supervision is adequate is a separate question, governed by regulation – and that is a matter for the SRA, not the courts.

The Law Society has confirmed it will now review and update its practice note to reflect the amended judgment. Until that updated guidance is published, firms should read the existing practice note with this clarification in mind: the risk of inadequate supervision is a regulatory and professional conduct risk, not a criminal one. That is not a reason to relax standards – far from it – but it removes the more extreme interpretation that had caused anxiety.

What firms should actually be doing now

The overall position post-Mazur, post-practice note, and post-clarification is this: the pre-existing model of delegation is restored, the Law Society’s practice note sets out the supervision framework, and the SRA is working on updated guidance of its own which the profession should watch for. In the meantime, the practical actions for litigation teams are clear.

The single most important mindset shift is this: supervision can no longer be treated as something that happens informally, by osmosis, or by assumption. The Court of Appeal’s judgment explicitly requires “proper direction, management, supervision and control” for delegation to be lawful. That means firms need to be able to demonstrate, through documented processes, that this is what they are actually providing.

The questions every litigation practice should be working through are:

• Is there a named authorised person responsible for each matter on our system, with practising rights that cover the conduct of litigation?
  
  
• Do we have written policies and procedures that describe how litigation work is allocated between authorised and non-authorised staff, and what each is responsible for?
  
  
• Can we produce, for any given matter, a clear record of the delegated instructions given and the key decisions taken by the authorised person?
  
  
• Is the level of supervision we apply to non-authorised staff calibrated to the complexity and risk of the work, and is that calibration documented?
  
  
• Have all staff involved in litigation – at every level – been trained on the updated policies and what the judgment means for how they work?
  
  

For firms that were already operating robust supervision frameworks, this will largely be a documentation and communication exercise: ensuring that what the team does in practice is captured in writing in a way that evidences compliance. For firms where supervision has been more informal or ad hoc, Mazur — and the SRA’s forthcoming guidance — represent a genuine prompt to invest in getting the framework right.

The broader context

Mazur does not sit in isolation. The SRA’s own annual assessment of continuing competence – and the new consultation on strengthening the competence regime which we have covered separately – both point to supervision as an area of active regulatory focus. The SRA has confirmed it will be issuing updated guidance on effective supervision in the wake of the judgment, and that guidance will be worth reading carefully when it arrives.

It is also worth noting that the Law Society’s vice president, Brett Dixon, has explicitly encouraged all litigation solicitors to familiarise themselves with the SRA’s guidance on supervision, conducting litigation, and its enforcement strategy. That is not boilerplate. It is a signal that the SRA’s approach to supervision in the post-Mazur environment will be an active area of scrutiny, not a passive one.

The good news is that the judgment – and particularly the 22 April clarification – has drawn the appropriate boundaries. Supervision is a regulatory matter. Firms that take it seriously, document it properly, and build it into how their litigation teams operate day to day are well-placed. Those that treat the restoration of the delegation model as licence to continue with informal oversight are misreading what the judgment actually requires.

Key sources:
Court of Appeal judgment in CILEX v Mazur & Others [2026] EWCA Civ 369 (31 March 2026), as amended 22 April 2026 (para 31A)
Law Society practice note: Mazur and the conduct of litigation (13 April 2026)
Legal Futures, Iain Miller analysis (23 April 2026) SRA statement on Mazur (31 March 2026)